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Chief Justice Traynor and the Law of
Taxation
By ADRIAN A. KRAGEN*
Most lawyers, if asked to name the area of Chief Justice Traynor's
foremost contribution to the law, would suggest conflict of laws, prod-
uct liability, or civil procedure. His influence was enormous in those
areas, which underwent significant developments during his tenure on
the California Supreme Court. It may nonetheless be persuasively ar-
gued that Chief Justice Traynor's most distinctive contribution lay in
the area of taxation.
His effect on tax law was pervasive. As a law professor, Traynor
influenced the professional lives of a generation of lawyers with his
exacting analysis of tax issues and his commitment to intellectual rigor.
As a consultant to the California State Legislature, he wrote or helped
write much seminal tax legislation. While he was on the court, his
opinions-both majority and dissenting-had a substantial impact on
the development of California tax law. This article explores, in a bio-
graphical manner, Chief Justice Traynor's contribution to the law of
taxation as a professor, consultant to lawmakers, and jurist.
In the spring of 1931 Professor Traynor began teaching a course at
the University of California called Principles of Income and Inheri-
tance Taxation. Except for a course on the constitutional principles
underlying the law of taxation, the subject of tax law had never before
been taught in the School of Jurisprudence. Thus, Traynor's course
was the students' first exposure both to the procedural and statutory
aspects of tax law and to the philosophical underpinnings of the tax
system.
* Shannon Cecil Turner Professor of Law Emeritus, Boalt Hall School of Law, Uni-
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Although in the 1930s the subject contained a substantial compo-
nent of constitutional law, students regarded it as esoteric and ex-
tremely complicated. Traynor's reputation as a teacher, however,
enticed courageous students to take the course, and his intellectual
rigor convinced many of them to pursue tax law as a specialty. Over
the next ten years, Traynor's course inspired a substantial number of
attorneys to undertake work as private practitioners or government em-
ployees for the refinement of the federal, state, and local tax systems.
Traynor inculcated in them a respect for the integrity of the tax system,
which was later demonstrated by their contributions to the field of
taxation.
In the early 1930's California confronted the need to raise addi-
tional revenue for welfare, education, and other governmental pro-
grams. Professor Traynor was asked to assist in devising sound
methods of taxation that would equitably and efficiently raise the
needed revenue. Professor Traynor was instrumental in the drafting
and enactment of the retail sales tax,' the use tax,2 and the bank and
corporation franchise tax.3 In addition, he drafted the Personal Income
Tax Act4 in its entirety. The sales tax, use tax, and personal income tax
remain the major sources of revenue for the state. Cities and counties
have also adopted the sales and use tax provisions, making them an
important source of local revenue.
Professor Traynor also helped persuade the state legislature to ap-
prove the new taxes. He took part in meeting the constitutional chal-
lenges to the new laws, especially the use tax, and his ideas and
expertise were vital in defeating efforts to have the taxes declared
unconstitutional.
From 1935 until his appointment to the California Supreme Court,
Professor Traynor participated in drafting amendments to and regula-
tions for the various tax statutes. His guidance and influence helped to
make the California tax administration a model for the equivalent
agencies of other states. As Special Deputy Attorney General under
Attorney General Earl Warren, Traynor significantly influenced the
presentation of California's legal position on tax cases before the state
1. Retail Sales Tax Act of 1933, ch. 1020, 1933 Cal. Stat. 2599 (current version at CAL.
REv. & TAx. CODE §§ 6051-6095 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984)).
2. Use Tax Act of 1935, ch. 361, 1935 Cal. Stat. 1297 (current version at CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE §§ 6201-6249 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984)).
3. Act of March 1, 1929, ch. 13, 1929 Cal. Stat. 19 (current version at CAL. REv. &
TAX. CODE §§ 23001-26491 (West 1979 & Supp. 1984)).
4. Personal Income Tax Act, ch. 659, 1943 Cal. Stat. 2354 (current version at CAL.
REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 17001-19452 (West 1983 & Supp. 1984)).
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and federal courts. He advised the tax department of the attorney gen-
eral on its opinions to state agencies and on its briefs before the courts.
In the process, many of Professor Traynor's concepts were adopted by
the courts and became guiding rules for the administration of state tax
statutes.
In 1937 Professor Traynor's views on taxation gained wider recog-
nition when he become a consultant to the United States Treasury De-
partment. Professor Traynor received three major assignments in
Washington.
5
One project in which Professor Traynor took part was an effort to
prevent the misuse of the statutes of limitation on deficiencies and re-
funds. In collaboration with Professors John Maguire and Stanley Sur-
rey, Professor Traynor devised a procedure to prevent misuse of the
statutes while preserving the statutes' essential purpose of laying con-
troversies to rest. The material developed by Traynor and his collabo-
rators was incorporated in the 1938 Act6 and, after the tax bar became
familiar with it, was widely approved as a better method of handling
the problem.
Professor Traynor's second responsibility was the development of
a more efficient method for determining the tax consequences of pro-
posed transactions. After considerable analysis of the problem, the
concept of adapting the "closing agreement" procedure to future trans-
actions was recommended and adopted. 7 The new procedure allowed
the Internal Revenue Service to issue an advance ruling on the tax con-
sequences of a future transaction and to enter into a binding agreement
with the taxpayer to honor that ruling.8
The third project in which Professor Traynor was involved engen-
dered considerable controversy among the tax bar. Traynor was asked
to devise a faster and more efficient method for the courts to consider
tax controversies. He and his associates recommended removing tax
cases from the federal district court system by the creation of a decen-
tralized Board of Tax Appeals and a specialized Court of Appeals. Op-
position to the proposal by portions of the bar and judiciary resulted in
5. Traynor was assigned a fourth project, the complete revision of the administrative
provisions of the income tax system. This project, unfortunately, was diverted from congres-
sional attention by the codification of the tax laws that became the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, 53 Stat. 1.
6. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 820, 52 Stat. 447, 581-83.
7. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-544, § 801, 52 Stat. 447, 573 (amending Reve-
nue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 606, 45 Stat. 791, 874).
8. See Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 606, 45 Stat. 791, 874, amended by
Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-544, § 801, 52 Stat. 447, 573.
May 19841
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
a battle fought in the law reviews. 9 The controversy eventually led to
the abandonment of the proposal by the Treasury Department, but
consideration of a single Court of Tax Appeals has continued to this
day.10 In addition, the debate over the Traynor proposal increased re-
spect for the tax court within the legal community.
During the 1930's, Traynor wrote a number of articles on subjects
in the field of taxation." One of his earlier articles, National Bank
Taxation in Calfornia,'2 remains the most complete work ever written
on national bank taxation. Spanning three issues of the Caif/ornia Law
Review, the article manifests Traynor's lucid writing, his ability to syn-
thesize and explain complicated concepts, and the breadth of his under-
standing of the underlying principles of taxation.
When Professor Traynor was appointed to the California Supreme
Court in 1940, many expected that he would make major contributions
to the law of taxation. They were not disappointed. During his tenure
on the court, he wrote more than twenty-five majority opinions and
over twenty dissenting opinions, as well as a large number of concur-
ring opinions, in tax cases.' 3 A number of these decisions had a lasting
effect on the administration of the state and local tax systems in Cali-
fornia and other jurisdictions. A discussion of some of the major cases
follows. 14
Justice Traynor's opinions in tax cases, like his other opinions, dis-
played thoughtful analysis and a superb mastery of the English lan-
guage. An early opinion, Mercury-Herald Co. v. Moore,'5 involved
property tax procedure. In that case property had been deeded to the
9. See, e.g., Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 25
WASH. U.L.Q. 399, (1940); Youngquist, Proposed Radical Changes in the Federal Tax Ma-
chinery, 25 A.B.A. J. 291 (1939).
10. See Caplin & Brown, A New U.S. Court of Tax Appeals. S. 678, 57 TAXES 360
(1979); Ginsberg, Making Tax Law Through Judicial Process, 70 A.B.A. J. 74 (1984); Miller,
A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975).
11. McGuire, Surrey & Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48 YALE L.J.
509-32, 719-78 (1939); Traynor, National Bank Taxation in Calhfornia, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 83-
119, 232-57, 456-528 (1929); Traynor & Keesling, The Scope and Nature of the California
Income Tax, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1936); Traynor & Keesling, Recent Changes in the Bank
and Corporation Franchise Tax Act, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 499 (1933);
Traynor & Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax
Controversies, 7 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 336 (1940).
12. Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California, supra note 11.
13. The appendix contains a list of Justice Traynor's decisions in taxation cases that are
not discussed in the text. These decisions cover most tax areas subject to state or local
legislation.
14. It would be impossible to consider all of these cases in this brief article. Therefore,
the author will focus on a few major decisions and their impact.
15. 22 Cal. 2d 269, 138 P.2d 673 (1943).
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state because the former owner had failed to pay property taxes. The
issue was whether a statute that terminated the former owner's right to
redeem the property was unconstitutional because it impaired the obli-
gation of contract. The Attorney General of California had filed a brief
arguing that the statute was unconstitutional. When the supreme court
held the statute unconstitutional, Justice Traynor filed a dissent so
compelling that the Attorney General joined with the petitioner in re-
questing a rehearing.
After the rehearing Traynor wrote the majority opinion holding
the statute constitutional. The opinion explored the basis of redemp-
tion for property tax delinquency, carefully distinguishing rights due to
a contractual relationship between the state and a taxpayer from the
state's right to enforce tax laws by taking possession of land because of
the unpaid taxes. 16 Moreover, after the land had been deeded to the
state, the taxpayer retained only a revocable right to redeem. Noting
that the statute provided for notice to the taxpayer, the opinion con-
cluded that the statute was constitutional.
17
Another of Justice Traynor's significant tax decisions, West Pub-
lishing Co. v. McColgan,'8 addressed the constitutionality of the Cali-
fornia corporation income tax. Speaking for a unanimous court,
Justice Traynor wrote an opinion holding that a tax on net income
from interstate commerce, as distinguished from a tax on the privilege
of engaging in interstate commerce, did not conflict with the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution. The court also decided that the
Franchise Tax Commissioner had the right to determine a taxpayer's
taxable income even though the taxpayer refused to furnish requested
information. The opinion approved the Commissioner's action, stating
that the "[p]laintiff cannot complain of alleged errors in the computa-
tion of tax liability, when it refused to avail itself of its administrative
remedies to prevent or correct such errors."'19
One majority opinion that contributed substantially to the area of
property taxation was De Luz Homes v. County of San Diego.2" The
issue in De Luz Homes was the propriety of the procedure used to as-
sess possessory interests in a housing project located on land owned by
the United States. Under California law, a private party using real
property owned by a tax exempt entity is subject to tax at the "full cash
16. Id. at 272-73, 138 P.2d at 674.
17. Id. at 275, 138 P.2d at 676.
18. 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861, afdper cur/am, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
19. Id at 712, 166 P.2d at 865.
20. 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
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value" of the possessory interest in that property.2' The proper method
of valuation previously had been a matter of substantial controversy.
Justice Traynor's opinion compared the methods of evaluation em-
ployed by the assessor and the trial court with the method proposed by
the plaintiff. After examining this highly technical question, Traynor
ascertained the proper method for determining the full cash value of
the leasehold. The De Luz Homes opinion illustrates Traynor's ability
to render a comprehensible decision in a highly complicated matter.
Roehm v. County of Orange 22 further illustrates Justice Traynor's
ability to contemplate an abstruse question and emerge with a lucid
decision. The issue in Roehm was whether items of intangible prop-
erty, in that case an on-sale liquor license, could be treated as personal
property subject to county property taxation. The licensee argued that
for over 100 years liquor licenses had been regarded as a type of intan-
gible property that was not taxable under the California Constitution.
The county contended that a liquor license was property within the
meaning of article XIII of the California Constitution, that all property
was taxable unless specifically exempted, and that nothing in the con-
stitution exempted this particular type of property from taxation.
Justice Traynor examined article XIII, section 14 of the California
Constitution (as amended in 1933),23 which grants the legislature the
authority to tax certain types of personal property. He concluded that
section 14 was intended to define specifically which intangible property
was subject to property taxation and that intangible property not spe-
cifically mentioned was excluded. He noted that the legislature had
followed this interpretation in implementing the amendment. Justice
Traynor's conclusion that liquor licenses are intangible property not
subject to taxation is still the law. Traynor acknowledged that intangi-
ble property values may be reflected in the value of property subject to
property taxation, thus giving rise to some property tax consequences
from the possession of a license. 24 This latter view has been followed in
a number of decisions since Roehm.
25
21. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 107.1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1984).
22. 32 Cal. 2d 280, 196 P.2d 550 (1948).
23. Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 30, ch. 63, 1933 Cal. Stat. 3072, 3074 (cur-
rent version at CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (West 1954 & Supp. 1984)).
24. 32 Cal. 2d at 285, 196 P.2d at 556.
25. See Simplicity Pattern v. Board of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 900, 615 P.2d 555, 67
Cal. Rptr. 366 (1980); Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d
340, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1962); ITT World Communications, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara,
101 Cal. App. 3d 246, 162 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1980).
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In General Dynamics v. County of Los Angeles,26 Justice Traynor
considered the application of the local property tax to limited posses-
sory interests in tax exempt personal property. General Dynamics had
contracted to operate a plant owned by the United States Navy, using
equipment owned by the Navy. The county assessor took the position
that the company had a possessory interest in the government-owned
personal property as well as the real property. Under the doctrine of
De Luz Homes, the possessory interest in real property was subject to
property taxation. Thus, the issue was the propriety of assessing a
property tax on General Dynamics' possessory interest in the personal
property. The county urged that, for purposes of taxation, there was no
logical distinction between possessory interests in real and personal
property; therefore, it argued, the decision in De Luz Homes was
controlling.27
Justice Traynor pointed out that the legislature had provided that,
for tax purposes, title to real property included the right to possession,
but had failed to so provide for personal property. He concluded that
even though personal property might be as valuable as real property,
the legislative omission was controlling.
28
Justice Traynor answered the county's contention that the question
of title was immaterial so long as the essential economics of the trans-
action were the same with the following statement:
Although in any given case the impact of a use tax and a property tax
might appear identical, they are not the same thing, and we cannot
sustain a property tax here on the ground that the Legislature could
constitutionally provide for the levy of a tax of equal amount under a
different scheme. To be valid a use or possession tax would have to
apply to all tax exempt property so as not to discriminate against the
private use or possession of property owned by the United States,
and it is for the Legislature, not the court, to determine whether such
a nondiscriminatory tax on possessory interests in tax exempt per-
sonal property should be adopted and to determine the measure of
such a tax.29
The opinion also examined whether the contractor could be con-
sidered the owner of the personal property. Traynor reviewed the
terms of the contract and concluded that the Navy was the owner al-
though ostensible title was in the contractor, because the title was so
constricted that it rendered any ownership claim by the contractor
26. 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958).
27. Id. at 63-64, 330 P.2d at 796.
28. Id. at 64-66, 330 P.2d at 797.
29. Id. at 67, 330 P.2d at 798.
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invalid.30
The opinion in General Dynamics is typical of the rigor of Tray-
nor's reasoning, which was presented in a manner that seemed to pre-
clude any substantial questioning of his conclusions. At the same time,
he clearly indicated to the legislature how it could achieve a different
result if it so desired.31 This decision has been frequently used as the
guiding opinion in tax cases involving transactions with federal, state,
and local governments.
32
Chief Justice Traynor's comprehension of the California tax sys-
tem was especially manifest in his dissenting opinions. One of the early
dissenting opinions was Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. McColgan.3 3 This
very important case concerned the interpretation of section 8(h) of the
Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act (as amended in 1937 and
1939), which allows a corporation to deduct from gross income the por-
tion of dividends received that is attributable to income "which has
been included in the measure of the tax."' 34 The case involved a divi-
dend declared by a California corporation that leased oil and gas
properties. For the tax years in question, 1937 and 1938, the corpora-
tion had taken the statutory deduction for depletion from gross income
before declaring the dividend to Rosemary Properties, the plaintiff. By
reason of the depletion deduction, the first corporation's net income for
the purposes of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act was less
than its earnings and profits.35 Rosemary Properties argued that the
dividends were entirely exempt from tax under section 8(h) of the
Act.
36
The Franchise Tax Commissioner contended that, to the extent
that the dividends were paid out of earnings and profits which ex-
ceeded net income, the income from which the dividend was paid had
not been included in the measure of the tax and, therefore, the dividend
was not entitled to the exemption accorded by section 8(h).37 The
court, however, found that the pertinent legislative enactments ex-
pressed an intent to consider the corporation's gross income, including
30. Id. at 68, 330 P.2d at 799.
31. Id at 64-65, 330 P.2d at 797.
32. See, e.g., City of Desert Hot Springs v. County of Riverside, 91 Cal. App. 3d 441,
154 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1979); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 3d 402, 524-525 (1973).
33. 29 Cal. 2d 677, 688, 177 P.2d 757, 764 (1947) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
34. Act of July 1, 1937, ch. 836, 1937 Cal. Stat. 2324, 2328; Act of July 22, 1939, ch.
1050, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2934, 2942 (The current version reads, "which has been included in the
measure of the taxes." CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 24402 (West 1970)).
35. Rosemary Properties, 29 Cal. 2d at 678-80, 177 P.2d at 758-60.
36. Id at 681, 177 P.2d at 760.
37. Id at 680-81, 177 P.2d at 760.
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earnings and profits, in measuring the amount of the tax.38 In the ma-
jority's view, because the legislature had not intended to restrict the
section 8(h) tax exemption to dividends paid out of taxable net income,
it was immaterial for purposes of section 8(h) that the depletion was
not part of the net income figure and had not actually been taxed.
3 9
Justice Traynor's dissent reveals a broader knowledge of the basic
premises of the Bank and Corporation Franchise Tax Act than is dis-
played in the majority opinion. Traynor illustrated by a number of
examples that net income is different from earnings and profits. Earn-
ings and profits are derived from a variety of sources, and funds from
some of those sources are specifically excluded from income for bank
and corporation franchise tax purposes. Such excluded funds would
not be considered to have been included in the measure of the tax.40
For example, in the case of a non-California corporation doing busi-
ness in California and other states, and whose gross income is only
partially attributable to California, only the portion of dividends allo-
cable to California income would be excluded under the language of
section 8(h).41 As Traynor stated, "Since such earnings and profits are
not included in the corporation's net income and, therefore, not in-
cluded in the measure of the tax, dividends declared therefrom do not
meet the requirements of section 8(h).' '42 Justice Traynor explained the
computation of net income, earnings, and profits, as well as the way
various items are reflected in each category for the purposes for deter-
mining the measure of the tax. He demonstrated that not all gross in-
come is included in the measure of the tax and that net income was the
criterion selected by the legislature.43 As Traynor pointed out, the leg-
islature intended to preclude the double taxation of income; but income
that had not been directly subject to the tax did not come within the
protection of the statute.44
This dissent is a fine example of Traynor's mastery of an especially
complicated area of tax law and his ability to make the intricacies of
the law easily understood. In this opinion Justice Traynor also articu-
lated his deep interest in the integrity of the taxing system, stating that
[a] comprehensive tax statute such as the Bank and Corporation
Franchise Tax Act exemplifies intricate draftsmanship; it evolves out
38. Id at 684-88, 177 P.2d at 762-64.
39. Id. at 684, 177 P.2d at 761-62.
40. See id. at 692-95, 177 P.2d at 767-68.
41. Id at 692-93, 177 P.2d at 767-68.
42. Id. at 694, 177 P.2d at 767-68.
43. Id at 701, 177 P.2d at 769.
44. Id at 689, 177 P.2d at 765.
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of the painstaking deliberations and studies not only of public offi-
cials but of others interested in tax legislation. Such a statute,
wrought from a consideration of many conflicting interests, cannot
long retain unity and coherence if one section or another is refabri-
cated by the courts without regard for the structural whole. The
technical concepts of the statute, its express provisions, should not
lightly be vitiated by facile phrases such as 'gone through the tax
mill' or 'flailed by the taxmaster' that denote a lack of insight into the
legislative purpose that binds together the provisions of the statute.
If the express words of the statute are overridden by such phrases
neither taxpayers nor tax officials can look to the written word of the
statute for its authentic meaning, and the already difficult task of un-
derstanding the revenue acts becomes hopeless.
45
Two of Chief Justice Traynor's important dissents, Flying Tiger
Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles46 and Scandinavian Airlines System,
Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,47 (S.A.S.) concerned the application of
the local property tax to airlines involved in interstate and foreign com-
merce.48 The court treated Flying Tiger as a California corporation
and S.A.S. as a foreign corporation. In Flying Tiger, the county had
assessed the airplanes at 100% of their value without regard to the time
the airplanes actually spent in Los Angeles County. In S.A.S., there
was an apportionment, but the airline questioned the validity of allo-
cating to Los Angeles any foreign-registered and foreign-based aircraft.
Traynor's dissent in Flying Tiger agreed with the majority that a
domiciliary state could not tax migrating property to the extent of its
taxability elsewhere. His view, however, was that the taxing agency
was only precluded from measuring the tax to the extent that the airline
showed contact with other jurisdictions that would subject it to taxa-
tion. In Flying Tiger, and later in SA.S., he enunciated the concept
that the United States Constitution does not preclude a state's appor-
tioned taxation of aircraft flown in interstate or foreign commerce.
Traynor pointed out in S.A.S. that, in the absence of congressional ac-
tion, it was not appropriate to deny the states the authority to levy taxes
on instrumentalities of foreign commerce which were within the juris-
diction of the states for a percentage of time. Congress had discretion
to exercise that power, and if it did not do so, it was inappropriate for
45. Id. at 700, 177 P.2d at 771.
46. 51 Cal. 2d 314, 327, 333 P.2d 323, 331 (1958) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
47. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 43, 363 P.2d 25, 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 44 (1961) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
48. Although the United States Supreme Court, more than twenty years later, took a
different position on the particular doctrine with which he was concerned, see Japan Line
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), the decisions in the intervening period
and even the opinion of the Supreme Court were materially influenced by views expressed
in Traynor's dissents. See infra note 49.
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the courts to restrict the taxing authority of the states.
49
Another noteworthy Traynor dissent is found in First Unitarian
Church v. County of Los Angeles.50 The case arose on the issue of the
constitutionality of article XX, section 19 of the California Constitu-
tion, which denied a tax exemption to any organization "advocat[ing]
the overthrow of the Government of the United States or the State by
force or violence or other unlawful means."5' Section 32 of the Reve-
nue and Taxation Code implemented section 19 by requiring any or-
ganization applying for a tax exemption to declare that it did not
advocate violent overthrow of the government.52 The First Unitarian
Church had filed an application for exemption of its real property from
property tax. The exemption was denied on the ground that it had not
included the declaration required by section 32. On appeal, the court
upheld the constitutional and legislative provisions primarily on the
grounds that the provision was uniformly applicable and did not dis-
criminate against religious groups. The court held that the free speech
provision of the first amendment of the United States Constitution was
not an absolute right and that the prevention of subversion was an ap-
propriate basis for restricting free speech.
Justice Traynor vigorously contested the latter conclusion of the
majority, opening his opinion with the statement that "Section 19 of
Article XX and section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code unjustifi-
ably restrict free speech." 53 He strenuously criticized the substance and
the reasoning behind the majority opinion's conclusion that an organi-
zation is presumed to advocate the overthrow of the government by
unlawful means if it does not affirmatively declare to the contrary. He
49. Traynor's theories in S..A.S. and Flying Tiger were later adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Sea Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56,
117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974), and Japan Line Ltd v. County of LosAngeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571
P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 434 (1979). However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Japan Lines decision and denied states the right to apportion ad
valorem taxes in relation to foreign instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce. The
Court's theory was that federal uniformity would be threatened by state taxation of instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce and that it was essential for the federal government to
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. Al-
though the Supreme Court rejected Traynor's premise that the states had authority unless
Congress acted, both Traynor's dissent in S.A.S. and the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in
Japan Lines recognize that need for national uniformity. The only difference was that Tray-
nor took the position that it was a Congressional prerogative which had not been exercised.
50. 48 Cal. 2d 419, 443, 311 P.2d 508, 522 (1957) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
51. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19 (West 1954) (repealed 1976 and exact language reen-
acted at CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 9 (West Supp. 1984)).
52. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 32 (West 1970).
53. First Unitarian Church, 48 Cal. 2d at 443, 311 P.2d at 522 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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pointed out that the majority opinion would allow the state to make
determinations on what constituted right thinking:
The issue thus narrows to whether a state can properly restrain
free speech in the interest of promoting what appears to be eminently
right thinking. A state with such power becomes a monitor of
thought to determine what is and what is not right thinking. Great as
a-state's police power is, however, the United States Supreme Court
has yet to sanction its breaking into people's minds to make them
orderly.
Errors in thought and expression are best counteracted by
deeper thought and more cogent expression. Only through discus-
sion can subversive doctrines be understood and effectively
combatted.
54
Although Justice Traynor had a very strong aversion to the tax exemp-
tions contained in the state constitution, he was not willing to allow a
tax exemption to be eroded or eliminated by means prejudicial to basic
constitutional rights. As he stated in his dissent, "Although free speech
may not be an absolute right, it must be jealously guarded."55
The foregoing discussion of Chief Justice Traynor's career as
teacher, author, consultant, and judge manifests the significant contri-
bution he made to the law of taxation. Whether Justice Traynor's in-
sights on taxation are his most valuable contribution to the law is really
immaterial. A man of his breadth may well be regarded as a "man for
all seasons." His multifold contributions to the law make him one of
the most influential persons in the development of the law. His ability
to develop lucid, logical answers to complex problems, his concern for
the integrity of the law, and his concern for the impact of law upon
people render Justice Traynor one of this country's preeminent legal
teachers, scholars, and judges.
54. Id. at 448, 450, 311 P.2d at 526, 527.
55. Id at 445, 311 P.2d at 524.
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Appendix
Listed below are opinions by Chief Justice Traynor in taxation
cases. The opinions discussed in the text are omitted here.
Majority opinions:
Kulchar v. Kulchar, 1 Cal. 3d 467, 462 P.2d 17, 82 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1969)
(liability for taxes under divorce decree).
Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 585, 446 P.2d
1006, 72 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1968) (real property taxation of royalties
under oil and gas lease).
Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 58 Cal. 2d 252,
373 P.2d 637, 23 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1962) (excess sales tax payments).
People v. Lucas, 55 Cal. 2d 564, 360 P.2d 321, 11 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1961)
(state's right to property on tax-deeded land).
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Quinn, 54 Cal. 2d 507, 354 P.2d 1, 6 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1960) (procedure for obtaining relief from challenged
assessment).
Forster Shipbuilding Co., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d
450, 353 P.2d 736, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1960) (property taxation of
leasehold in tax-exempt land).
Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 52 Cal. 2d 55, 338 P.2d 440 (1959)
(property taxation of leasehold in tax-exempt land).
Estate of Law, 50 Cal. 2d 345, 325 P.2d 449 (1958) (inheritance tax
payments from decedent's estate).
Pacific Pipeline Construction Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 49
Cal. 2d 729, 321 P.2d 729 (1958) (sales tax assessment on ex-
change of equipment).
El Toro Development Co. v. County of Orange, 45 Cal. 2d 586, 290
P.2d 569 (1955) (property taxation of leasehold in tax-exempt
land).
Victor Valley Housing Corp. v. County of San Bernardino, 45 Cal. 2d
580, 290 P.2d 565 (1955) (property taxation of leasehold in tax-
exempt land).
Fairfield Gardens, Inc. v. County of Solano, 45 Cal. 2d 575, 290 P.2d
562 (1955) (property taxation of leasehold in tax exempt land).
Peterson v. Johnson, 39 Cal. 2d 745, 249 P.2d 17 (1952) (redemption of
property sold for delinquent taxes).
Helvey v. Sax, 38 Cal. 2d 21, 237 P.2d 269 (1951) (quality of title to
property obtained by tax deed).
Estate of Knapp, 37 Cal. 2d 827, 236 P.2d 372 (1951) (valuation of
decedent's estate for inheritance taxation).
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In re Thurston's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950) (inheritance
taxation on inter vivos transfer of property).
Timm Aircraft Corp. v. Byram, 34 Cal. 2d 632, 213 P.2d 715 (1950)
(property taxation of funds advanced by United States to contrac-
tor as fund to carry out contract).
Isenberg v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 30 Cal.
2d 34, 180 P.2d 11 (1947) (unemployment insurance contributions
on behalf of freelance jockeys).
Paso Robles War Memorial Hospital District v. Negley, 29 Cal. 2d 203,
173 P.2d 813 (1946) (taxation to repay indebtedness and property
taxation of interest in tax exempt land).
Estate of Madison, 26 Cal. 2d 453, 159 P.2d 630 (1945) (inheritance
taxation of transfers in trust).
Wells Fargo & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 25 Cal. 2d 37, 152 P.2d
625 (1944) (interest on recovery of taxes paid under protest).
Dissenting Opinions:
Estate of Vai, 65 Cal. 2d 144, 156, 417 P.2d 161, 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 705,
714 (1966) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (inheritance taxation of legacy
executed pursuant to contract made during testator's life).
Westminster Memorial Park v. County of Orange, 54 Cal. 2d 488, 497,
354 P.2d 247, 253, 6 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781 (1960) (Traynor, J., dis-
senting) (taxation of cemetery property).
Speiser v. Randall, 48 Cal. 2d 903, 904, 311 P.2d 546, 547 (1957) (Tray-
nor, J., dissenting) (effect on tax exemption of refusal to declare
loyalty).
First Methodist Church v. Horstmann, 48 Cal. 2d 901, 902, 311 P.2d
542, 543 (1957) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (effect on tax exemption of
refusal to declare loyalty).
People's Church of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. County of Los Ange-
les, 48 Cal. 2d 899, 900, 311 P.2d 540, 542 (1957) (Traynor, J., dis-
senting) (effect on tax exemption of refusal to declare loyalty).
Prince v. City of San Francisco, 48 Cal. 2d 472, 475, 311 P.2d 544, 546
(1957) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (effect on tax exemption of refusal
to declare loyalty).
People v. County of Tulare, 45 Cal. 2d 317, 321, 289 P.2d 11, 13 (1955)
(Traynor, J., dissenting) (procedure to review actions of State
Board of Equalization).
Hall v. Chamberlain, 31 Cal. 2d 673, 681, 192 P.2d 759, 764 (1948)
(Traynor, J., dissenting) (effect of curative legislation deed on de-
fective tax sale).
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California Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 31 Cal.
2d 217, 224, 187 P.2d 745, 749 (1947) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (mo-
tor vehicle transportation license tax assessment of carrier's in-
tracity operations).
S. Siwel & Co. v. Los Angeles County, 27 Cal. 2d 724, 735, 167 P.2d
177, 183 (1945) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (distinction between "tax"
and "assessment;" construction of statutes authorizing refund of
taxes erroneously collected).
Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353, 364, 153 P.2d
746, 752 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring & dissenting) (procedural
requirements of equalization hearing and review of decision by
county board of equalization).
Ross v. City of Long Beach, 24 Cal. 2d 258, 265, 148 P.2d 649, 653
(1944) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (exemption from taxation of prop-
erty used for public schools).
Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal. 2d 774, 785, 147 P.2d 531, 537 (1944)
(Traynor, J., dissenting) (effect of curative legislation on prior tax
proceedings).
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